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Robert Rowland begins his excellent analysis and evaluation of the recent United 
States debt ceiling debate with a quote from the current US president, Barack 
Obama. In discussing the role of the US Constitution and its relation to the liberal 
public sphere, Rowland quotes the President as saying the following, “the most 
important feature of the Constitution [is] to ‘organize the way by which we argue 
about our future,’ creating ‘a conversation…in which all citizens are required to 
engage in a process of testing their ideas against an external reality, persuading 
others of their point of view, and building shifting alliances of consent.’” Rowland 
provides this quote in order to help make at the outset a crucial distinction between 
the constitutional structure within which a society might operate and through which 
collective decisions are formally enacted and a broader, interpenetrating collection 
of structures, commitments, and relationships – some formal, others informal – that 
constitute a society’s so-called public square, where a citizen populace, to quote 
Mann and Ornstein, are engaged in “reconciling diverse interests and beliefs” 
through “adversarial debates and difficult negotiations.” 
 That such a distinction exists is clear. And Rowland’s characterization of the 
public square side of it, helped by the work of Habermas, Goodnight, and others, is 
persuasive. The same can be said of his detailed examination of the argumentative 
thrusts and counter-thrusts of the major parties involved in the tortured and highly 
volatile debt ceiling negotiations and of his final judgment regarding the extent to 
which each of these parties discharged their respective responsibilities. But it seems 
to me that if are going to have a clearer picture of why it is that we in the United 
States are having this apparent breakdown in the health of the US body politic that 
we cannot do so by focusing merely on the one side of this distinction. We must talk 
more about that formal framing structure that the President refers to in his 
comments: the constitutional order through which the liberal public sphere is able 
to make manifest through formal votes and official enactments some of the fruits of 
its turbulent negotiative process. For as I see it, this order, as it is currently 
structured, is in fact warping the ways in which the liberal public sphere is 
operating in the United States. It is providing some truly perverse incentives for all 
of the actors involved in the liberal public sphere’s processes for reconciling diverse 
interests and beliefs.  
 Let us begin with the simple fact that in the last election for the US House of 
Representatives, one of the two major political parties in the United States won a 
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nation-wide plurality of almost one-and-a-half million votes over the other party, 
but that at the same time the latter party was able to maintain a thirty-three seat 
majority in the lower house of the US Congress due to their advantage at the state 
level in congressional redistricting following the decennial 2010 US Census (Klein, 
2012). (This has happened only once before in the last seventy years (Wang, 2013).) 
For those who live in a constitutional system in which proportional representation 
in some form is employed, such as Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, 
Germany, Japan, etc., etc., etc., such an outcome is truly astonishing. One would have 
to chalk it up to the fact that the United States is one of the few purportedly 
democratic countries left in the world that does not use a list system, an alternate 
vote system, a single transferable vote system or something of the like. But the 
primary reason is even more astonishing than that. Citizens of the United States live 
in a constitutional system that, in the overwhelming majority of its sovereign 
jurisdictions, allows the shape and character of electoral districts to be largely 
determined by whichever party happens to be in power at the conclusion of the 
decennial census (League of United Latin American Citizens v. Perry, 2006). As a 
result, savvy legislators, employing complex computer modeling, have the ability to 
create essentially safe districts for those who are in their own political party. They 
do this by finding ways of sprinkling within each of the districts they have created a 
somewhat smaller number of individuals who are likely to vote for the opposing 
party (this is called “cracking”) or, where possible, they unite such individuals into a 
single district or small set of districts, thereby taking them out of neighboring 
districts where their presence could pose a challenge to the dominant party’s 
electoral hegemony. 
 The perverse incentives that such a system provides for actors within the 
public sphere are obvious and many commentators have remarked upon them. The 
public becomes disengaged, seeing no connection between their activities and the 
legislative process—out of 22 major democracies, the United States is twenty-first in 
terms of total voter turnout (Dahl, 2001, p. 169)—representatives perceive no 
disadvantage in holding onto positions that are disapproved of by significant 
minorities and often majorities of the population, and media opinion and expert 
advice can as a consequence perform no informative, moderating, or mediating 
function with respect to either the public or the members of the national legislature. 
 But that is not all. For when we consider not just the ways in which 
representatives are elected to the country’s national legislative bodies, but the 
character of those bodies themselves, their strikingly unrepresentative nature 
becomes even more obvious. For example, the number of members in the United 
States House of Representatives, the intentionally more representative branch of the 
US Congress, has not increased for over a century, when the Apportionment Act of 
1911 set it at 435. Perhaps this number made sense in 1911. After all, the 1910 
Census reported the population of the United States to be 92,228,496.  But a few 
things have changed in the interim. In 2010, the population of the United States was 
reported to be 308,745,538 (University of Virginia Library, Historical Census 
Browser). Such a ratio of representatives to population not only compares 
unfavorably to nations such as the United Kingdom (630 members of the British 
House of Commons for a population of 63,181,775), France (577 members of the 
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French National Assembly for a population of 65,350,000) and even Canada (308 
members of the Canadian House of Commons for a population of 33,476,688), but 
because of the federal nature of representation in the United States, with each state 
getting at a minimum one representative no matter what its population, rapid 
growth in larger states means that states in the middle of the population pack lose 
representatives over time despite continued growth in their populations. One 
hundred years ago, my now home state of Wisconsin had twelve representatives to 
the United States Congress. It now has seven. Yet Wisconsin has only increased in 
population during this time. 
Notice that I am not even bringing up what a lot of other popular and 
scholarly commentators have remarked upon when discussing these issues: for 
example, the giant disparities between states in the US Senate, where both the state 
of California and the state of Wyoming have the same level of representation, 
despite the fact that the population of the former is almost seventy times greater 
than that of the latter (a ratio never contemplated by the Founding Fathers when 
they created this body); the various insidious forms of senatorial privilege that can 
be used on no more than a whim to bring all legislative discussions to an absolute 
screeching halt; and the tremendous amounts of cold hard cash that are required to 
run for public office in the United States.  
Now, I am by no means suggesting that Rowland is unfamiliar with the above 
facts. Nor am I maintaining that his analysis suffers from their absence. But when we 
think of the character of the liberal public sphere in the United States, when we 
think of the ways in which the various roles within it are formed, cemented, 
regularized, incentivized, we must consider too the various characteristics of the 
particular constitutional order in which they are embedded. We know that a certain 
kind of constitutional order is not sufficient to produce genuine social engagement 
and debate. But appropriate formal structures are necessary for those roles to form 
and flourish in anything like an effective way. A liberal public sphere that is this 
disconnected from the actual process of law-making is one in which, it seems to me, 
pretty much anything goes because only a sub-set of what is said is likely to result in 
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